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MEASURING INCONSISTENCY METHODS 
FOR EVIDENTIARY VALUE 
Fred Cohen 
California Sciences Institute 
California, USA 
 
Many inconsistency analysis methods may be used to detect altered records or 
statements. But for admission as evidence, the reliability of the method has to be 
determined and measured. For example, in China, for evidence to be admitted, 
it has to have 95% certainty of being correct,1 and that certainty must be shown 
to the court, while in the US, evidence is admitted if it is more probative than 
prejudicial (a >50% standard).2 In either case, it is necessary to provide a 
measurement of some sort in order to pass muster under challenges from the 
other side. And in most cases, no such measurement has been undertaken. 
The question of how to undertake a scientific measurement to make such a 
determination, or at least to claim such a metric, is not well defined for digital 
forensics, but perhaps we can bring some light to the subject this issue. 
CAUSALITY, REFUTATION, AND CONFIRMATION BIAS BASICS 
I have said and will likely say this often and again. Effect does not imply cause. 
Rather cause (C) acting through mechanisms (m) produces effects (E), expressed 
as C→mE. To have a scientific hypothesis, it is not enough to state that C 
produces E, it is also necessary to identify the mechanism by which C produces 
E. Testing can then be repeatedly done to confirm or refute the hypothesis of 
C→mE by trying to refute the hypothesis. If refutation fails, it is a confirmation, 
while if refutation succeeds, the hypothesis as stated cannot be correct. While 
many confirmations may be found, any number of confirmations of a universal 
statement do not prove it to be correct, while a single refutation demonstrates its 
falsehood.3 Typically, science progresses when a refutation is identified, the 
errors in the  C→mE hypothesis are identified, and an updated C'→m'E' version 
of the hypothesis is created to mitigate the refutation cases, or the hypothesis is 
abandoned. 
Studies over many years show that prior beliefs or information tend to effect 
outcomes and, specifically, that scientific results are biased toward prior beliefs. 
                                                     
1 Zhang, Xiao, Chinese graduate student in law. Personal correspondence. 
2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 US 579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 113 
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This is often called confirmation bias.4,5 If confirmation testing is done instead 
of refutation testing, there is a tendency to have false confirmations, and the 
stronger the prior belief, the more pronounced the confirmation bias effect. This 
is not malicious, it is human nature, and the nature of science when performed 
by people. 
While we might expect that in a system in which prosecutors control all 
examination of evidence there would be an extremely high rate of successful 
prosecution, China has a 30% acquittal rate6, and only 50% of reported cases 
involving digital evidence in 2012 went to trial7, in some part because the 95% 
certainty required for forensic evidence cannot always be met. A prima facie 
case could be made for requiring certainty metrics on evidence compensating for 
confirmation bias, but insufficient evidence is currently available. 
INCONSISTENCY ANALYSIS EXAMPLES AND LIMITATIONS 
Detecting inconsistencies between records is fundamental to challenging 
evidence, and as such, it is fundamental to establishing credence. Because sound 
science is based on refutation rather than confirmation, scientific hypotheses are 
tested by trying to show they are wrong rather than trying to show they are right. 
This avoids confirmation bias and establishes that causality is consistent with 
repeatable testing. Inconsistency analysis consists of various methods for testing 
records against other records and statements (i.e., traces and events)8 for type C 
(internal) and type D (external) consistency. If and to the extent records are 
inconsistent, they cannot all be true. For example, if a person states that they 
were at a place at a time, and records show that they were elsewhere at that time, 
then the statements, the records, or both must be wrong. While the seemingly 
logical assertion detailed in the footnote9 has not reached more than random level 
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of consensus (68% agreement, which is inadequate for consensus at the sample 
size as of the last study on this issue), we will assert it nonetheless.10 
In most digital systems, many different and redundant traces are produced, and 
thus many different tests for inconsistency may be found. Examples include: (1) 
travel information with computer and facility access logs, which should be 
consistent in terms of time and location; (2) computer login and online credit 
card usage, which should indicate that the user was logged in when their credit 
card was charged for an online transaction; (3) DNS, Web access, and email 
records, which should indicate DNS logs just prior to uncached Web access and 
MX record lookups just after initiating emails; and (4) identity management 
system records and access to department databases, which should indicate that 
those accessing records from a given department have roles matching the records 
accessed. 
But just because two or more records appear to be inconsistent doesn't actually 
mean that either or any are wrong. In fact, records may indicate seemingly 
inconsistent situations and all be right, in the sense that they are all effects of 
consistent causes acting through identifiable, but different, mechanisms. To get 
a sense of this, suppose we have log files, file system state, and user statements 
in which the stated time sequences for the same acts took place in different orders 
(e.g., (A, B, C), (A, C, B), and (C, B, A)). This would seem, on its face to be 
inconsistent. But as we examine causality of the actual mechanisms at play, we 
might identify that the different mechanisms work in different ways and thus 
produce records in different sequences or with different precision and accuracy. 
 A person may indicate arrival at 08:00, login at 08:05, and file access at 
08:10; 
 while the badge reader indicates entry at 08:05, the login record on the 
computer indicates login at 08:04:31, and the file server indicates file 
access at 08:03:25.2316; 
 and the log server may record door entry at 08:02:12, file system access 
at 08:03:18, and login at 08:04:15. 
                                                     
statement. Similarly, if a sworn statement states that a particular file was created at 
10AM on a particular day in a particular place, and the metadata for the file indicates 
that the same file was created at a different time on a different day, the sworn 
statement is inconsistent with the metadata. Assuming this definition as the basis for 
your answer, respond to the following statement: As a fundamental of digital 
forensics, what is inconsistent is not true (or in other words, the inconsistent things 
cannot all be true).  
10 Cohen, F. (2012). Update on the state of the science of digital evidence examination. 
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security, and the Law, 2012. 
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The only way to really understand these records properly is by experimentation, 
which we call reconstruction. In this process, we reconstruct a similar 
environment under various conditions and seek ways in which the event 
sequences may be reconciled. In the process, we likely will learn about the 
precision and accuracy of the different time sources and recording methods and 
about links between cause, mechanism and effect. If we perform enough 
experiments to determine that the records cannot be reconciled, then we have a 
definitive refutation in the sense that the set of claims from the three sources 
cannot all be true; another hypothesis about how they came to be must be sought. 
But if we find a reconstruction that shows similar records and sequences, we 
may refute the definitive claim of inconsistency, yet this does not prove the 
records to be right. Indeed we can almost never prove the records right because 
we cannot normally exhaust all possibilities. 
As an alternative to reconstruction, which is often expensive, we may do analysis 
to refute hypotheses. For example, we may take a look at historical records over 
the same time period and identify that other cases of different orderings between 
records of the log server and badge reader, login records, and file server access 
are found. This would explain the apparent inconsistency. But if no such 
instances are found, that only confirms the hypothesis that the records are 
normally consistent in this respect and does not explain the causal chain 
associated with the events in question. It does not prove altered records or 
demonstrate that the person is lying, and it does not provide a causal chain 
explaining apparent inconsistency. 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH COMPUTER-RELATED RECORDS 
The truth of computer-related records is that they often appear to indicate things 
that did not in fact happen. That is, effects appear to indicate causes, but in fact 
the apparently indicated causes may produce other effects and other causes also 
produce undistinguished effects. This is because the mechanisms presumed and 
apparently indicated are not really the mechanisms present.  
Example: The apparent and often presumed indication of a record 
stating that a person entered a door at 08:05 is that the person actually 
entered the door at that time. But the actual mechanisms that produce 
those records may be based on clocks not perfectly set and of limited 
resolution, and are associated with unlocking mechanisms and not 
movements of people. The methods by which they are produced and 
recorded may have delays, end up in different orders, and reflect 
different physical mechanisms than the outputs seem to indicate. 
Explanation: The recording mechanism of the badge reader system 
keeps records at 5 minute precision rounded up when it sends logs of 
those records to the logging server as the badges are read. Thus the badge 
reader record of 08:05 is consistent with the logging server record of 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1) 
 
11 
08:02:12. The human recollection of time has limited precision and 
accuracy, may be based on a wrist watch or other clock besides the badge 
reader, and may be recalling the arrival at work rather than use of the 
badge reader. 
We now have a possible causal chain that is consistent in terms of facility 
entrance. Let's look at logins next: 
Example: The record of computer login at 08:04:31 and the log server 
record of computer login at 08:04:15 are consistent if we assume that 
clock accuracy is only good to the nearest minute. But assumption is the 
problem here. We would need to examine further to determine if this is 
in fact the case. Suppose it is not, and that both systems use a common 
time base and are measured regularly so that we can demonstrate that 
they are synchronized to within one second at almost all times and that 
other sorts of records contemporaneous with those at issue are within a 
second of each other. 
Explanation: It turns out there are other ways these times could differ 
by 16 seconds. For example, it might be that the login record in the 
logging server reflects a timestamp collected at the start of the login 
process, while the login time recorded on the computer system reflects 
the time at which the password was determined correct. These could 
easily be 16 seconds apart. Of course the human time remains too 
inaccurate to be distinguishable and we are now consistent again. 
But what of the file server access records? 
Example: The file system records indicate access at 08:03:25.2316 
while the logging server indicates access at 08:03:18. Obviously, there 
is a difference in precision of the records displayed. But in addition, the 
logging server seems to say that the access occurred before the file 
system indicates it. The synchronization issue returns, as does the issue 
of what actual process produces which records. 
Explanation: Suppose the file system sends an audit record to the 
logging server when a file is opened but records last access only when 
the file is closed. Then the records would be consistent with a file open, 
access and close over a 7-second period, even if the clocks were closely 
synchronized. 
But what of the sequence? Even if each redundant record may be independently 
reconcilable, the overall sequence seems infeasible, and inconsistent across 
explanations. How can a user access a file before being logged in or present, and 
how come the sequence identified by the user differs from that of the computer 
records? 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1) 
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Of course it turns out that there are plenty of feasible explanations for the 
differences in sequence as well. But none will be provided here for this example. 
The problem is that all of this is speculation, as is any claim that the records are 
inconsistent or consistent, unless and until there is a scientific basis for making 
claims of causality based on the traces produced as effects. 
MEASUREMENT THEORY AND REACHING A DEFINED LEVEL OF 
CERTAINTY 
The resolution of this issue must ultimately come in the form of a theoretical 
basis for making and using measurements and actual measurements tested 
against that theory. Today, we don't, as a field of scientific endeavor, have a 
widely agreed-upon theory of measurement for digital traces. 
It's not that we disagree all the time. As a community, those 
who work in digital forensics largely agree at some poorly-
defined level of consensus. Perhaps the biggest problem we 
face is that we often agree on things that are demonstrably 
wrong. 
It is common practice today to make timelines based on digital records such as 
those detailed above, and to try to produce claims of causal sequences based on 
the effects reflected in those traces. But in almost all cases I have seen, there is 
no initial determination that the time-related records accurately and precisely 
reflect things that can be ordered relative to each other at the level of time 
differences at issue based on those records or the mechanisms that produce them. 
In simpler terms, the claims are made without adequate basis. In most cases, no 
basis is provided at all, and the time-related records are assumed accurate and 
precise as shown. 
To get a sense of how far this is from a good solution, note that even if a basis 
was provided, that basis would have to be shown reliable to a level of certainty 
appropriate to the evidence admissibility requirements at hand. To date, I have 
rarely seen an instance where it was even demonstrated that a record was 
differentiable from a random number in any probabilistic sense. The business 
records exception is commonly used to admit evidence, to wit: “this record is 
regularly collected in the course of business and relied upon for its day-to-day 
operations.” This establishes an unknown reliability and non-scientific basis for 
admission. 
I am not a statistics expert, but, at a minimum, to reach 95% likelihood that a 
cause produces an effect, an experiment would have to be repeated 20 times with 
no more than one case in which the cause failed to produce the effect. While this 
is a starting point, sampling theory tells us about standard distributions and 
random samples, but is typically not probative with respect to the highly 
repeatable and brittle processes associated with the finite state automata that 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1) 
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produce traces used as digital evidence.11 In order to link a cause through a 
mechanism to an effect, it might, for example, be useful to be able to turn the 
mechanism off and back on, producing no effect with the mechanism off and the 
identified effect with the mechanism on. This is realistically attainable as a 
reconstruction for the instances above involving digital records. For example, 
here is a starting point: 
 The badge reader indicates entry at 08:05: Check the time records 
produced by using the badge reader, first under existing conditions, then 
under other conditions, including enabling and disabling the logging 
mechanisms, setting times in its internal clock to different values, and 
entry during different times relative to the start and end of an hour (e.g., 
enter at one minute intervals, offset by 10 seconds for each experimental 
run, producing 6 runs for 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 seconds after each 
minute). This might produce enough records to be able to demonstrate 
the precision and accuracy of the badge reader internal recording 
mechanism to the desired level of certainty and test the hypothesis of 
round up, time offset errors, etc. 
 The log server records door entry at 08:02:12: Repeat the above 
experiment with the log server enabled and not enabled, with the 
standard initial time of the log server and variations on time settings, and 
under various load conditions of the server and network. The idea is to 
see whether and to what extent differentials in time may reflect different 
mechanisms that might produce them, and then based on these results, 
look for indicators of those mechanisms in the relevant time frames to 
the issues at hand. While, ideally, we would produce an actual entry at 
0800 with badge reader and audit records producing identical values to 
those in the actual case, demonstrations of the level of variation and 
conditions should be adequate to demonstrate reliability of those records 
relative to each other, or in the alternative, failure to observe any such 
variations under any identifiable test conditions should indicate that the 
various hypotheses are refuted by the tests. 
 The login record on the computer indicates login at 08:04:31: Just as 
for the cases above, and in particular for identified cases such as the 
difference between timestamp collection and recording times and phases 
of the login processes, testing can be performed to determine how 
closely correlated physical activities and recorded records are for each 
of the relevant records as well as differentials and conditions which 
cause them between computer system logs and logging server logs. 
Hypotheses about what logs are produced by what mechanisms at what 
                                                     
11 Cohen, F. (2012). Digital Forensic Evidence Examination, 4th ed. ASP Press, 2012. 
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times can be tested by enabling and disabling various mechanisms, to 
the extent that is feasible. 
 The file server indicates file access at 08:03:25.2316: This has similar 
testing requirements to the records produced by logging in. In the case 
of file servers, things can get more complicated, for a wide range of 
reasons. Some such reasons include different clock and recording 
resolutions for different file systems (e.g., FAT file systems retain time 
stamps to a 2 second resolution (which means a 4 second maximum 
range for a given time) while NTFS counts at 100 nanosecond intervals 
and EXT3 is 1 second, while EXT4 is 1 nanosecond12), multiple time 
stamps (e.g., modify/access/create may be produced by different 
mechanisms in different ways), and I am unaware of any file system that 
records times to 4 digits of precision, an apparent inconsistency with the 
data provided above. 
 The log server recorded door entry at 08:02:12, file system access at 
08:03:18, and login at 08:04:15: Without a lot more detail about the 
mechanisms in use, a wide range of possibilities exist. For example, we 
would want to differentiate the mechanisms by which times might be 
recorded and information sent to the logging server. Some records might 
be batched and sent periodically or when a buffer is filled, while others 
might be sent in real-time. Some might be sent via the UDP protocol, 
which drops datagrams but doesn't typically delay them significantly, 
while other mechanisms might use TCP which has retries and other 
reliability features. Does the logging server records when it gets records 
or rely on timestamps from those records? Does it always add new 
records to the end of a log file or does it have multiple log files? Is the 
order of recording the same as the order of arrival? Is there a 
prioritization mechanism in the network or logging server? What 
happens as it runs out of disk space? The list goes on. 
Reconstruction is non-trivial and, to be efficient and effective, one must select 
what to test in what way and with how many samples in order to produce 
reliability information adequate for admission.  It cannot generally be based on 
historical testing in “similar” systems. In fact, reproducing behavior often comes 
down to the exact set of software and revisions of an operating environment, and 
I have had cases where this made the difference in outcomes in the legal matter. 
Many experts merely claim that various things are true based on their experience, 
but the expert who wants a scientific basis should test such claims in situ to 
determine whether they are refuted. In case after case, common wisdom and 
asserted experience has been refuted by reconstruction. 
                                                     
12 Need citation(s) for these times. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1) 
 
15 
Why not reverse engineer instead of reconstructing, etc.? 
The simple answer in the US is that it's illegal13. For “computer security” 
reasons, reverse engineering is legal as of a Federal Trade Commission ruling of 
a few years ago, but for forensics purposes, it is still not permitted. So the 
legitimate expert cannot look at a disassembled version of the binary of the 
operating system to determine how a record is produced. 
This is similar to many other things in forensics. While there are many ways to 
address a technical question, legal systems limit what can be done and how they 
can be done. As a scientist, you might like to do anything you like, but as an 
expert witness in a legal matter, you cannot just try things. Actions are limited 
by the client's willingness, the court's desire, available time and money, what is 
already known science, and the legal process you work under. 
Even if we could reverse engineer all of the software and hardware involved in 
typical systems of today, environmental conditions also have an effect on records 
produced. High load conditions, lack of storage space, and other extremes in 
resource availability have pronounced effects. But far more subtle causes, such 
as single bit errors in memory, interactions between multiple processes and 
programs, unanticipated input sequences, and a long list of other similar causes14 
may produce changes in the apparent operations of interacting mechanisms. The 
state of the art in software and hardware analysis is inadequate to effectively 
predict the envelope of effects from the reverse engineered mechanisms or to 
rule out other potential mechanisms. 
EDITORIAL SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Building the science of digital forensics is fundamental to advancing justice in 
the information age.  We are at a unique point in time where we can make an 
enormous difference in this advancement. The field is emerging, science in legal 
matters is under scrutiny, and tie information age is bringing about a dramatic 
emergence of digital evidence in the courtroom. Science is not local to a 
jurisdiction, and effective law enforcement in the information age requires 
global cooperation. Around the globe, scientists are seeking to make progress, 
and they are succeeding, albeit slowly and with little support. 
Finding ways to measure claims about evidence in legal matters is not a simple 
or even well-understood matter. Reconstruction can often be done under 
                                                     
13 Cohen, F. (2010). The DMCA Still Restricts Forensics. Retrieved from 
http://http://all.net/Analyst/2010-08.pdf on August 1, 2010.  
14 Cohen, F., Phillips, C., Swiler L. P., Gaylor, T., Leary, P., Rupley, F., and Isler, R. 
(1998).  A cause and effect model of attacks on information systems. Some analysis 
based on that model, and the application of that model for cyberwarfare in CID. IFIP-
TC11 Computers and Security, 17(3): 211-221. 
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conditions anticipated or asserted, and the results of repeated testing under 
different reconstruction conditions can be revealing in terms of numerical 
assessments of reliability and refutation or confirmation of various claims. Of 
particular use is testing with and without mechanisms active, as this 
differentiates the causal chains associated with those mechanisms and allows 
claims of causality to be shown, with repetition producing results of the form of 
“[X] of [Y] of the cases tested demonstrated [causal mechanism] which is 
consistent with [claim]. This is a [100*X/Y]% reliable result.” 
I invite all of those reading and writing for this publication and others to engage 
in the discussion of the advancement of the science, and to do so in the form of 
letters to the editor. 
I look forward to the opinions of others–sent to the editor, to me, or as part of 
published work. 
 
 
